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Abs t rac t

Recent research indicates that the two hemispheres of the human brain
serve different functions when processing visual information.
Specifically the left hemisphere, for most individuals, is
specialized for an analytic or sequential type of processing and the
right hemisphere is specialized for a holistic or gestalt type of
processing.

However this dichotomy is not always found, and it is

hypothesized that individual subject differences may partially
account for the somewhat inconsistent results in the research
literature.

The present study attempts to examine the effect of one

individual difference dimension upon process latera1ization .
Subjects were classified into two types, Type 1 and Type II, based on
previously established criteria.

Type I individuals are

characterized as having only a holistic processing capability, while
Type II individuals have both holistic and analytic processing
capabilities.

This individual difference variable is hypothesized to

have an effect upon the analytic/holistic latera1ization dichotomy
within the two hemispheres of the brain.

The subjects in the present

study were divided into Type I and Type II subject groups.

However

the low incidence of Type I subjects observed precludes any
meaningful comparison between the Type I and Type II groups.

The

data from subgroups of subjects that were observed were examined for
analytic/holistic latera1ization effects.

It was hypothesized that

process latera 1ization would occur in the Type II subjects, since
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these individuals have been described as having dua1-processing
capabilities.

Functional analytic/holistic differences between the

two hemispheres were not found.

Future research is suggested to

clarify the role of individual differences along the Type I/Type II
and analytic/holistic dichotomies within the hemispheric
specialization researcli literature.

Individual

Differencps in

La lera I ization of Cognitive Processes:
Type I and Type II Processors

A commonly used method for investigating ways in which the human
brain processes visual information is a same-different comparison
task.

Using this procedure, a trial consists of two simultaneously

or successively presented stimuli that are either the same or vary
along some experimenter-manipulated dimension, and the subject is
asked to judge whether the stimuli are the same or different.
Typically, studies have found that the more dissimilar the two
stimuli are, the faster is the reaction time (RT) to make a response
of "different".

In addition, "same" responses have been found to be

much faster than the average "different" response (Bamber, 1969;
Bindra, Donderi, and Nishisato, 1968; Egeth, 1966; Hawkins, 1969;
Nickerson, 1972).

This is known as the "fast-same" phenomenon.

There has been little agreement among researchers as to the
methodological procedures or cognitive mechanisms that account for
these observations.

Felfoldy (1974), Krueger (1973), and Williams

(1972) have suggested that the same-different phenomena may be due to
biased stimulus sampling.

In the typical same-different experiment,

the total number of possible "same" trials is less than the total
number of possible "different" trials.

This follows from the fact

that there are only n ways to achieve all possible stimulus
combinations for "same" trials (where n = the total

number of

u

stimiiLL), but the total number of possible "different" trials is
jifn-l) (Nickerson, lh7J; Silverman & Goldberg, 1975 ).

This is

because the "same" trials utilize stimuli that are indeed, exactly
the same, hence the individual stimuli that compose "same" trials are
used more often than the individual "different" stimuli in order to
achieve a .50 probability that a given trial will actually be "same"
or "different".

In other words, since "same" and "different" pairs

occur with equal frequency, the possibility that any given pair of
stimuli are repeated is greater for the "same" trials.

Williams

(1972) and Krueger (1973) suggest that RTs to "different" stimuli
would tend to be slower than RTs to "same" stimuli because each
"different" combination is novel.

Since each "same" pair eventually

involves repetition, they are more likely to produce faster RTs.
Williams (1972) and Kreuger (1973) systematically varied the
frequency of occurrence of specific stimuli, including "same" pairs,
and found a significant effect of stimulus frequency on RT; the more
frequently appearing stimuli had shorter RTs.
As a test of this proposition, Silverman (1973) used a
same-different paradigm in which no specific stimulus pair was
repeated.

Silverman found that RT to "same" pairs of five-digit

numbers was still significantly faster than RT to "different" pairs.
Nickerson (1973), in addition to pointing out several possible
methodological and empirical flaws in Williams' (1972) study, varied
the frequency of occurrence of specific stimuli and found that
repetition effects alone could not account for the "fast-same"
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phenomena.

Also, the results of Kreuger's (1973) experiment are

equivocal since the difference between "same" and "different" KT was
also significant when stimulus frequency differences were controlled.
Thus it appears that sheer frequency of "same" pairs can not account
for the "fast-same" phenomenon.
Several models of visual stimulus processing have been
postulated to account for the "fast-same" phenomenon.

Most common

among the various models are those that assume the operation of a
single-process type comparison.

Some researchers have proposed

various stimulus "priming" models (e.g.,
Proctor, 1981).

Beller, 1971; Grill, 1971;

According to these models, during successive

presentations of stimuli, the first stimulus acts as a prime for the
second.

If the second stimulus is the same as the first, a fast

"same" response can be made since encoding the second stimulus is
facilitated by the priming effects of the first stimulus.

When the

second stimulus is different, there is no facilitation effect, but
rather an inhibition effect occurs which results in increased KT.
Evidence for the facilitation of priming effects can also be found in
the verbal

learning hierarchies and linguistic conceptual

organizations research literature (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Meyer &
Schvaneveldt , 1971).
While priming models appear to account for "same" responses
being much faster than "different" responses, they suffer from a lack
of genera1izabi1ity .

Priming, by definition, can occur only with

successive stimulus presentations, that is, some degree of temporal
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separ.ition between stimuli is required (Bagnara, Boles, Simion, k
Umilta, 1982).

This is assuming, of course, that simultaneously

presented stimuli are indeed processed simultaneously, an assumption
which has apparently gone unchallenged.

Although Proctor (1981)

argues that the same-different results occur only with successive
stimulus presentations, studies have indicated that the "fast-same"
phenomenon can be found using simultaneous stimulus presentations,
when priming effects can not operate (Bagnara, Boles, Simion, &
Umilta, 1982; Nickerson, 1973).

Clearly, stimulus priming models are

inadequate in trying to understand all "fast-same" data since priming
effects can occur only with successive stimulus presentations.
Other researchers have emphasized the comparison process itself,
and a single-process, se1f-terminating type comparison model has been
proposed to account for some same-different comparison task results
(Egeth, 1966; Hawkins, 1969).

This single-process model states that

features of the two stimuli are compared and as soon as a difference
is detected, a "different" response is made.
is analytical
sequentially.

The comparison process

in nature, in that stimulus features are analyzed
This model can explain the decrease in RT as the two

stimuli become increasingly dissimilar since the more disparate
features there are, the sooner a disparate feature will be detected
and a "different" response made.

The single-process model also has

an advantage over stimulus "priming" models in that comparisons can
be made with either simultaneous or successive presentations.
Difficulty arises however, with regard to the frequent observation
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that "same" responses are faster than the average "hifCerent"
response.

Under a single-process, feature comparison model, "same"

responses should be slower than the average "different" response
since a "same" response can be emitted only after all possible
feature comparisons have been made.

It would appear that another

comparison process is responsible for "same" responses being, faster
than the average "different" response.

Accordingly, several

researchers have proposed a two-process model to explain some
same-different comparison task results.

"Different" responses are

thought to originate from an ana Iytic-type, feature comparison
process, much the same as the single-process type model described
above, and "same" responses are thought to be determined by a gestalt
or holistic comparison process, with both processes operating
simultaneously in the same person (Bamber,

1969; Hock,

1973; Keuss ,

1977; Nickerson, 1972; Silverman and Goldberg, 1975; Taylor, 1976a,
1976b).

An analytic processor would necessarily compare each

stimulus feature until a difference was found, hence the more
dissimilar the second (probe stimulus) is to the first (criterion
stimulus) the quicker a difference can be detected and a "dilferent"
response made.

A gestalt or holistic type processor could detect

sameness faster than an analytic type of processor because the
holistic processor would not waste time comparing each stimulus
feature, but instead would compare the stimuli as wholes.

A

two-process model seems to represent more closely the existing data
on visual comparisons.

Thus Silverman and Goldberg (1975) state:

s

"There seems to be no way ot explaining the present results (of their
study) within any single-process system, and therefore some
dual-process system seems the only workable theoretical framework
that accommodates the ' same 1 - 1different' data" (p. 19 3).
It should be noted that many of the early studies of visual
stimulus processing, while employing considerable variability in
design, were concerned with how the brain as a whole processes visual
information.

Typically, these studies utilized stimuli that were

presented in the subject's center visual field (CVF).

This procedure

assured that the visual images of the stimuli would be equally
accessible at the same point in time across all neuronal tracts of a
subject's visual system, including those within the two hemispheres
of the brain.

However, delineation of specific parameters of a

phenomenon are often achieved by varying one or more aspect of an
experimental situation and comparing the results of this new
situation with that of the old.

This principle is especially true of

the information processing literature.

By manipulating visual field

of stimulus presentation (among other variables), researchers are
able to examine hemispheric differences in visual stimuli processing.
In recent years much attention in cognitive and physiological
psychology has been devoted to hemispheric specialization of function
within the human brain.

The initial

impetus for hemispheric

specialization research was provided by Sperry and Gazzauiga
(Gazzaniga , Bogon, £ Sperry, 1955; Sperry, 1964, 1968,

1974).

Part

of Sperry's technique involves surgically separating the two cerebral

u

hemispheres by severing the connecting tissue, a procedure called a
commissurotomy.

Originally designed to alleviate the behavioral

effects of severe epilepsy, this procedure allows for exquisite
experimental control over many variables.
capability of the average researcher.

However, it is beyond the

Fortunately, simply varying

visual field of stimulus presentation circumvents the obvious ethical
and procedural problems associated with commissurotomy.

The

uiulerlying optical and neuro-anatomicaI mechanisms that allow such
non-invasive investigations are deceptively simple.
The retina of each eye can be divided into two equal areas.

The

retinal tissue that extends from the fovea (the approximate center of
the eye) towards the nose is called the nasal

retina.

That part

extending from the fovea towards the ear is called the temporal
retina.

When a subject is fixated on a point directly ahead, all

stimuli in the subject's right-visual-fie Id (RVF) are projected to
the temporal retina of the left eye and the nasal retina of the right
eye.

Similarly, all stimuli in the subject's left-visuaI-fie1d (LVF )

are projected to the temporal retina of the right eye and the nasal
retina of the left eye.

This process is called lateralizing the

optical input of a visual stimulus, or simply, 1 atera1ization of a
stimulus to the right or left visual field.

Furthermore, the bundles

of nerve fibers forming the optical tracts that extend from the
temporal retina of each eye project to the ipsilateral or same-side
cerebral hemisphere, where further processing of the visual image
takes place.

However, those nerve fibers that extend from the nasal
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retina of each eye cros$ over at the optic chiasm anti project to the
contra1 atera1 or opposite-side cerebral hemisphere.

In effect, any

stimulus appearing in a subject's RVF has direct access to the left
hemisphere (LH) and any stimulus in the LVF has direct access to the
right hemisphere (RH).

Naturally information transfer from one

hemisphere to the other is achieved through the corpus callosum and
other minor commissural tissue, but this transfer takes a finite
amount of measurable time.

It can be readily seen that, using a

same-different comparison task, RT differences to stimuli laterali^ed
to the LVF and RVF can be attributed to processing differences
between the two hemispheres.
Using this procedure (and others), it has been postulated that
the two cerebral hemispheres differ with respect to the type of
stimulus, and the type of stimulus processing, each is specialized
for.

This supposition is aptly stated by Oimorul and Beaumont (1974):
Another proposition about the two hemispheres is that although
each may proceed towards its solution of a task or problem,
each may do so in a rather different way, thereby
increasing the chance of a satisfactory solution but also
distributing the load between the cerebral hemispheres
by the introduction of special modes of function, (p. 49)
One system involving specialization of cerebral

verba1/visuospatia 1 dichotomy.

function is the

It has generally been recognized that

the LH is superior to the RH in processing verbal stimuli, while the
RII is superior in processing visuospatial stimuli.

There is

certainly no dearth of research literature supporting this dichotomy
(see Dimond & Beaumont, I97''4) and Bradshaw & Nettleton,
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lor

extensive reviews).
From studies involving lateralized tachistoscopic presentation
of faces (Geffen, Bradshaw, and Wallace, 1971, exps. 1 and II;
Patterson & Bradshaw, 1975), digits (Geffen et al.,

1971, exps. Ill,

IV, and V), and letters (Cohen, 1973; Martin, 1979) it has also been
suggested that the left hemisphere (LM) acts as an analytic or serial
type processor while the right hemisphere (RH) acts as a gestalt or
holistic type processor.

This analytic/holistic dichotomy at first

glance appears to be another rather simple, parsimonious functional
differentiation between the two hemispheres, but not all studies in
the literature are in complete agreement with it (Sergent, 1982),
while others find little or no evidence whatsoever to support it.
For example, in a study by Simion, Bagnara, Bisiacchi, Ronsato,
and Umilta (1980) subjects were required to make same-different
comparisons on three types of visually presented stimuli.
stimuli were normal

The

letters, letters on which a mental transformation

(rotation) had to be performed, and geometric shapes.

Part of the

researchers' interest was to determine if there would be a
significant visual

field X type of stimulus interaction, or if there

would be a significant visual
of process) interaction.

field X match (same/di fferent , or type

Simion et al. found the former interaction

significant but not the latter.

It is suggested that, at least in

this experiment, the type of stimuli (verha 1/visuospatia 1 ) were more
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f midamentaL than the process (analytic/gesta11 ) in determining
functional hemispheric asymmetries.
Alternatively, in a comparatively simple study by Egeth and
Epstein (1972) subjects were presented with two letters, all
capitals, one above the other, and the field of presentation was
varied.

Subjects were required to make same-different comparisons on

the letters.

Egeth and Epstein found a left visual field-right

hemisphere (LVF-KH) advantage for "different" judgements and a right
visual field-left hemisphere (RVF-LH) advantage for "same"
judgements.

Of course, these results are just the opposite of what

one would expect if the LH

were an analytic processor and the RH a

holistic processor.
Bagnara, et al. (1982), in a direct test of the
analytic/holistic dichotomy, used a paradigm developed by Taylor
(1976a) to require subjects to make same-different comparisons on
simultaneously and successively presented letter pairs.

Visual field

of presentation was varied to assess possible laterality effects.
The letters were composed from a fixed set of line segments and the
similarity of the letters was systematically varied by having the
probe letters differ on one, two, or three line segments from the
criterion letters.
repeated.

On "same" trials the two letters were simply

While bagnara et al. found that "same" responses were

faster than "different" responses, and RT to "different" responses
decreased with increasing dissimilarity between the two letters, they
did not find a significant visual

field X match (process)

I J

interaction.

It is difticult to explain the lack of an

analytic/holistic latera1ization effect when, if analytic and
holistic processing modes are indeed lateralized to the LH and KH
respectively, one should have been apparent.
It is even more difficult to compare the results of the Bagnara
et al. (1982) study with other studies because hemispheric function
experiments differ on so many variables such as response mode,
inter-stimulus-interva1, type of stimuli, method of presentation, and
subject characteristics.
at best.

Comparisons among experiments are tenuous

In fact the state of the existing 1 atera1ization of

cognitive function researcli may have been described best by Friedman
and Pol son (1981 ) :
.

. . the most frequent findings to emerge in well over 100

years of research are (a) the apparent capriciousness of the
phenomena, that is, the ease with which relatively superficial
changes of stimuli, instructions or other task parameters can
switch performance advantage from one hemisphere to the other;
(b) the large amount of data that defy replication across
laboratories and paradigms;

(c) the wide range of individual

performance differences observed on tasks that are supposed
to be lateralized one way or the other, even among populations
suspected to be relatively homogeneous in their degree of
latera1ization of function, such as right-handed males;
(d) the lack of consistency within individuals in the degree of
latera1ization they show across time and tasks; and finally,

Ih

(e) the absence of a global theory that can adequately
explain the factors underlying even the existing regularities
that have been observed.

(pp. 10.31 -1032)

Friedman and Poison (1981) propose a multiple-resource approach
to functional hemispheric latera1ization.

The basic idea underlying

their multiple resource theory is that the available cognitive
resources necessary to successfully perform a given task are many,
each existing in different degrees, and at least some possibly
differentially represented within the two hemispheres.
To use an example from Friedman and Poison (1981), suppose
subjects are required to learn a list of visually presented nouns
that are orthographica 11y and phonemically dissimilar.

The subjects

may choose to use a phonemic or semantic style of learning, or they
may choose to focus on the global shapes of the words, or even some
combination of the above, yet the task performance level may be the
same for all the subjects.
to obtain the same results.

Thus people may use different strategies
The types of resources used by a subject

are a function of such subject-task parameters as task difficulty,
response complexity, visual

field, exposure duration, stimulus type

and quality, practice, visual acuity, sex of subject, handedness, and
so forth, and the particular resources or subset of resources
required for stimulus processing.

The subset of resources required

by a particular task is called the resource composition.

I5

In addition, successful task performance may require the
resource composition of only the Lit, the RH, or some combination of
both, working together, via information transfer through the corpus
callosum.

Thus the resource composition of one hemisphere may be

qualitatively and quantitatively different from the resource
composition of the other hemisphere, hence task performance level
during lateralized stimulus presentations may not necessarily be
equal for all subjects for any given subject-task parameter or
combination of parameters.
The implications of such a multiple-resource model are enormous
because such a model, if operationally developed, can potentially
explain many of the disparate and inconsistent findings of many
laterality studies.

Friedman and Poison maintain that manipulating

such subject-task parameters as visual

field, exposure duration,

handedness, type of stimuli, and so forth, will change the
hemispheric resource composition needed to perform a given task and
thus may affect differential hemispheric processing level.
If a task can be performed using several different resource
compositions and if subjects differ in which resources are available
to them, then we would expect somewhat inconsistent results if
relevant subject-task parameters are not controlled for.

Thus

Friedman and Poison (1981) state that:
.

. . in addition to the fact that tasks vary in the extent to

which they demand resources from one or the other hemisphere,
we assume that subjects vary in the extent to which the
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resources of either hemisphere can be efficiently applied
to performance. . . we recognize that individual differences
in the factors above are important parameters of information
processing, so that it is probably most appropriate to speak
in terms of degrees of latera I ization for a given person
under a particular set of circumstances.

(pp. 1053-1054)

While Friedman and Poison do not explicitly indicate some
possible cognitive resources (we can assume analytic and holistic
processors to be two) and their nature and degree of latera 1 ization ,
if any, the approach taken by Friedman and Poison is unique in that
it attempts to unify the sometimes widely different findings in the
hemispheric specialization literature through a model that
discriminates between traditional experimenter-manipulated variables
and the individual differences in cognitive resources that a person
brings to a task situation.
".

.

Friedman and Poison (1981) conclude that

. efforts to delineate what the hemispheres are specialized for

may yield conclusions that depend as much upon the particular people
chosen for the study as they do upon whatever experimental
environment those individuals have encountered" (p. 1054).
Some attempt has been made to identify certain groups of
individuals for whom lateralization of cognitive processes may not be
as pronounced as for other groups.

In particular, evidence suggests

that females, as a population, may not be as completely lateralized
in hemispheric specialization as males (Kimura , 1969).

Evidence also
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suggests that Left-handed individuals are more diffuse in terms of
lateralization of cognitive function (Hecan & Sauguet, 1971;
Beaumont, 1974 ).
The hemispheric specialization differences between males vs.
females or left-handed vs. right-handed individuals are certainly
noteworthy, and many of the more recent studies control for these
differences to more adequately insure subject homogeneity.
this eliminates a possible source of confounding.

Obviously

However,

individual differences of these kinds are not entirely the types to
which Friedman and Poison (1981) are referring.

These variables are

merely superficial c1assificatory variables and as such, it is
difficult to infer a cause-and-ef feet re la t ionsli i p between an
individual's class and his or her degree of latera 1 ization .
Exposition of these variables should not elevate them to the status
of explanation.

They offer little by way of explaining hemispheric

performance differences between classes of subjects.
Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that these cI assificatory
variables represent the only relevant subject dimensions involved in
latera1ization effects.

However, the cognitive abilities to which

Friedman and Poison are referring may interact with male/female and
left-handed/right-handed classifications, and may be more fundamental
than these classifications.
Interestingly, there have been very few attempts in the
literature to identify other individual differences in visual
stimulus processing (Cooper, 1976; Cooper & Podgorney, 1976; Hock,

1 -s

1973; Hock, Gordon, & Marcus, 1974; Levy, 1983; Simmons, 1982).
However, as Friedman and Poison (1981) point out, subjects may bring
individual cognitive differences to a particular experimental task
that may confound the results of the experiment if the data are
pooled, as is usually done.
In an attempt to identify other types of individual differences
using non-latera 1 ized stimulus presentations, Cooper ( 1976)
identified two subgroups of individuals who apparently used two quite
different cognitive processes in a same-different comparison task.
Subjects were exposed to five "standard" nonsense shapes, each
different in the number of angles that composed the shape.
standard had seven "distractors".

Each

One distractor was a mirror image

of its standard and the other six were random perturbations of the
standard which varied systematically in their similarity to the
standard.

Each standard-distractor pair was presented successively,

and the subjects were required to judge whether the stimuli were the
same or different.

On half of the trials the stimuli were the same

and on the other half they were different.
Reaction time data were analyzed for each subject and two
distinct patterns were noted.

For some subjects "same" responses

were faster than "different" responses, "different" responses were
unaffected by the similarity of the test stimulus to the criterion,
and RTs and error rates were unrelated.
"Type I".

Cooper called these subjects

For the other subjects "same" responses were slower than

the average "different" response, but "same" responses were faster

than "different" responses when the stimuli were highly similar.
Also, KI dt^creased with increasing dissimilarity between the stimuli,
and there was a positive correlation between RT and error rates.
These subjects were labelled "Type II".
Cooper (1976) explains the performance of the Type I subjects in
terms of their using a rapid, single process, holistic type of
comparison.

If the outcome of this comparison produces a positive

match, the "same" response is executed.

If the outcome is negative,

the "different" response is made by default.

This single-process

model accounts for the rapid "same" responses and the somewhat slower
"different" responses, which require additional processing time.
The performance of the Type II subjects cannot be so easily
explained.

Cooper (1976) interprets the performance of the Type II

subjects in terms of a dual-process model in which independent but
simultaneous operation of a holistic and analytic processor is
assumed.

The "same" processor compares the two stimuli ho I istica I ly ,

as do the Type I subjects, but the decrease in RT as the stimuli
become increasingly dissimilar also indicates the operation of an
analytic type processor.

This analytic processor compares features

of the two stimuli, checking for differences.

The more differences

there are, or the more dissimilar the two stimuli, the quicker a
difference can be detected and a "different" response made.
Similarly, Hock, Gordon, and Marcus (1974) used embedded and
intact figures in a same-different comparison task to find evidence
for individual differences in visual stimuli processing.

One group
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of subjects, identified by Hock et al. as being "structural", were
affected by the rotation of intact figures.
to detect embedded figures.

They were also less able

Another group of subjects, termed

"analytic", were not affected by stimulus rotation and they were
better able to detect embedded figures.

The design utilized by Hock

et al. sought to identify a procedure for classifying subjects into
dichotomous catagories.

It's utility is questioned because as

Simmons (1982) points out, classification is determined solely on the
basis of the presence or absence of a rotation effect on RT and does
little to address either a single-process or dual-process theory of
visual stimulus processing.

Cooper's (1976) study however, employed

multiple criteria for determining Type I or Type II classification.
These criteria are directly relevant to single-process and
dual-process theories.

Also, subjects in the Hock et al. study were

required to give only a "same" response and ignore "different" trials
which results in an unneccessary loss of seemingly pertinent data.
Simmons (1982) concludes that Cooper's (1976) methodology is more
appropriate for investigating individual differences in visual
stimulus processing.
Clearly the individual differences identified by Cooper (1976)
have implications for the multiple-resource model postulated by
Friedman and Poison (1981), and hence laterality studies in general,
which attempt to identify asymmetrical hemispheric processing
abilities by aggregating data across all subjects.

By treating a

Type I or Type II processing preference as a subject-task parameter,

one could control for tliis variable and provide a more adequate test
of latera1ization effects.

In addition, any subsequent

latera 1ization of cognitive processes could possibly provide a more
operationa1ized indication of some cognitive resources, which
Friedman and Poison fail to do.
Perhaps as Friedman and Poison (1981) suggest, combining the
data from subjects who differ in their cognitive resources, or at
least in their processing preferences, will lead to confounding and
confusing results.

Thus it is hypothesized that 1 atera1ization

effects along a given dimension (e.g. analytic vs. holistic
processing) may be characteristic of only certain subgroups of
people.
The present study was designed to test just such an hypothesis
by first classifying subjects as Type I and Type II processors, then
examining the data of each group for evidence of analytic and
holistic process latera1ization .

Specifically, the study used

Cooper's (1976) criteria for classifying subjects as Type I or Type
II.

In addition, two different classes of stimuli were used to

examine the effects of stimulus type, if any, upon process
latera1ization .

Random nonsense shapes were used to extend Cooper's

(1976) procedure to lateralized stimuli presentations, and they were
compared with the verbal stimuli developed by Taylor (1976a).

Both

types of stimuli are well suited for use in the same-different
paradigm since both easily provide for differing degrees of criterion
and probe dissimlarity by manipulating the physical characteristics
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of the stimuli.

Generally, the study sought to determine the role,

if any, of the Type l/Type II dichotomy in latera 1 ization of
cognitive function.

Specifically, it was hypothesized that, given

the analytic/holistic dichotomy, latera 1 ization of process type would
appear only in Type II subjects, since these subjects have previously
been described as possessing duaI-processing capabilities (Cooper,
1976).

For these subjects the LH should show an advantage for making

"different" responses and the RH should show an advantage for making
"same" responses.

The Type I subjects however, should show no

latera1ization of cognitive functions, but rather KT to "same"
responses should be equal for both hemispheres.

Method

Subjects
The subjects were obtained from two large introductory
psychology courses taught at Georgia Southern College, during winter
quarter, 1985.

The subjects consisted of 30 undergraduate

right-handed males, all of whom had no immediate familial history of
left-handedness.

Subjects were initially screened for handedness and

familial history from a larger subject pool by using the questions
portion of the Harris Tests of Lateral Dominance (Harris, , see
Appendix A), plus additional questions concerning familial
left-handedness.

No individual was used who indicated using his left

hand for more than three items on the questions portion of the Harris

Tests, and who had a family member who was predominantly left-handed.
All subjects who passed this global screening were invited to
participate after they had been individually screened for appropriate
visual acuity using a Snellen chart.

No subject was used whose

visual acuity was not at least 20/40, corrected or uncorrected.

The

subjects were paid for their participation in the study.
Appa ra tu s
Following Cooper (1976), the stimuli used to classify subjects
as Type I or Type II consisted of nonsense shapes generated by
Attneave and Arnould (1956) Method I for the construction of random
nonsense shapes.

Cooper used five standard nonsense shapes and seven

distractor nonsense shapes per standard.

Since Cooper's

classification study required several hours and experimental sessions
per subject, a reduction in the number of stimuli was used in the
present study to decrease the total time needed to classify a
subject.

The stimuli used in the present study consisted of three

standard shapes and five distractor shapes per standard.

They were

the same ones used by Simmons (1982) to classify subjects as Type I
or Type II.

Each of the five perturbations per standard varied

systematically in their similarity to the standard.

Cooper (1976)

used a reflected or mirror image of the standard as one of the
distractor stimuli, but since the use of the reflected stimulus was
not crucial to the subject's classification, it was not used in the
present study.
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Each stimulus was black on a white circular field.

At a viewing

distance of 921 mm, the circular field subtended 4 deg of visual
angle and the stimulus itself subtended 2 deg of visual angle.
viewing distance was the same for all stimuli.

The

Each pair of

standard/distractor shapes was presented in 3 orientations of 0 deg,
120 deg, and 240 deg.
A different set of random nonsense shapes was used to examine
latera Iization effects.

This different set also consisted of three

standard shapes and five distractors per standard, but instead of
using three different standard/distractor orientations, visual field
was varied.

The standard stimuli were generated using Attneave and

Arnould (1936) Method I for the construction of random nonsense
shapes.

Cooper and Podgorney (1976) detail the construction of the

distractor stimuli.

During all stimuli presentations the standard

stimulus appeared in the center visual field (CVE) and the distractor
stimulus appeared in the left visual field (LVF) or the right visual
field (RVF).

Each stimulus was black on a white circular field.

The

circular field subtended a visual angle of 4 deg whi Ie the stimulus
itself subtended a visual angle of 2 deg.

The angle of separation

between the standard stimuli and distractor was 4 deg 21 min.
A set of verbal stimuli was also used to examine possible
effects of stimulus type on process latera 1 ization .

The verbal

stimuli developed by Taylor ( 1976a) in a study of non-1 atera1ized
analytic and holistic processes (see Figure 1) were used in the
present study.

Taylor used the letters A, E, 0, F, H, and U as

Wo. Liitferent SognionLs

1

2

1

Figure I. T.iy Lor' s Verbal Stimuli.
The letters shown are twice their actual
(Taylor, 19 76)

size.

standard or criterion stimuli. By varying the number of line segments
composing these letters, Taylor created distractor stimuli that
differed from the standard stimuli on one, two, or three line
segments.

All the distractor stimuli for each standard were one of

the other five standard stimuli.
In the present study, each of Taylor's (1976a) six standard
stimuli appeared in the CVK and eacli of the three distractor stimuli
appeared in the LVF, and the RVF.

The angle of separation between

the standard and distractor stimuli was 4 deg 21 min.
were presented in black on a white circular field.

The letters

The circular

field subtended a visual angle of 55.80 min and each letter was 37.20
X 22.20 min in size.

The thickness of the line segments composing

eacli letter was 6.6 min.
All the nonsense shape stimuli were constructed using ordinary
black and white construction paper.

The letter stimuli were drawn

into the circular field using Higgins black India ink and a Speedball
C-2 caligraphy pen.

All stimuli were presented by means of an Iconix

three-channel tachistoscope.

An electronic timer, coupled to the

tachistoscope, measured RT in msec and controlled presentations of
the stimuli.

The luminance level of all the white circular fields

2
was kept at 68.5 cd/m .

Procedu re
The total experiment was divided into three sessions.
was the same for all subjects.

The first

It was for the purpose of classifying
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subjects as Type I or Type II.

Subjects were greeted by tbe

experimenter and seated in front of the tachistocope.

They were then

asked to sign a Letter of consent (see Appendix B) and given written
instructions (see Appendix C).

Any questions concerning their task,

but not the explicit nature of the study, were then answered.
Using the reduced number of Cooper's (1976) nonsense shape
stimuli, the subjects were first presented with a central fixation
point in the CVF for 2000 msec followed by a standard stimulus in one
of three orientations for 3000 msec.

Immediately following the

offset of the standard stimulus an inter-stimu1 us-interva1 of 100
msec began, after which a distractor stimulus was presented in the
same orientation as the standard.

The subjects were required to

indicate whether the two stimuli were the same by saying "same" or
"different" into a microphone connected to a voice activated relay
which was coupled to the timer.

Reaction time was measured from the

onset of the distractor stimulus until a "same" or "different"
response was made.
Subjects were provided with verbal feedback concerning the
accuracy of their judgements.

Error trials were recorded and were

presented again, randomly interspersed with the remaining trials.
Subjects were told that for each trial the probabilities of the
distractor stimulus being the same as or different from the standard
were equal.
sessions.

This was true of all trials in each of the three
Prior to the experimental session proper each subject

participated in 13 randomly selected practice trials.

There were 10
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comparisons per standard in each orientation, 5 same and 5 different.
Thus 30 comparisons per orientation or 90 comparisons total, plus any
error trials, were made per subject.

The experimenter was blind as

to the results of this initial classification session until after all
three sessions were completed.
The second and third sessions were for the purpose of examininR
1 atera1ization effects.

Half of the subjects received the second set

of lateralized nonsense shapes and written instructions (see Appendix
D) in the second session and the verbal

letter stimuli and

instructions (see Appendix E) in the third session.

The other half

received the opposite sequence.
Presentation of the lateralized nonsense shapes was similar to
that of the previously shown non-lateraIized nonsense shapes.
However visual

field as a variable was substituted for the

orientation variable, with distractor stimuli appearing in the LVF
and RVF an equal number of times.
in the CVF.
point.

The standard stimuli appeared only

There was a 2000 msec presentation of a central fixation

Each standard stimuli then appeared for 500 msec.

Then there

was a 1000 msec inter-stimulus-interval which was followed by a 100
msec presentation of a distractor stimulus.

Each subject was given

13 randomly selected practice trials before the experimental session
proper.

There were 10 comparisons per standard in each visual

5 same and 5 different.

field,

Thus 30 comparisons per visual field or 60

comparisons total, plus any error trials, were made per subject.

Present.-? t ion of the la tera 1 ized , letter stimuli was the same as
that of the lateralized nonsense shapes.

Hie number of practice

trials, stimulus duration, and inter-stimulus-interval was also the
same.

There were 18 comparisons per standard, 9 same and 9

different, and 36 comparisons per visual field, per subject.

A total

of 72 comparisons, plus any error trials, were made per subject.
The response mode was a manual key-press for both 1 atera 1ization
sessions.

Since Berlucchi, Heron, Hyman, & Kizzolatti (1971) have

demonstrated that responding with the hand ipsilateral to the
stimulus is significantly faster than responding witii the hand
contralatera 1 to the stimulus, half of the subjects responded
"different" with their right index finger by tapping a key which was
positioned to the right of the subject's midline, and "same" by
tapping their left index finger on a key positioned to the subject's
left.

The other half had the opposite arrangement.

This procedure

should have also controlled for any response advantage that the right
hand may have had due to the left or verbal hemisphere having direct
access to RVF stimuli (and hence faster RT) if a verbal response were
used.

When not responding, subjects were asked to maintain their

index fingers on two non-functioning keys located between the two
responding keys.
Resul ts

Using the data from the initial classification session, the
subjects were first classified as Type I or Type II according to

iu

Cooper s (1976) criteria.
ditferent

1

because each overall "same" vs. overall

KT comparison was based on 45 data points per mean, it

was felt that this comparison would be the most reliable in terms of
the variance within each group of RTs.

Those subjects whose overall

mean "same" RT was slower than their overall mean "different" RT were
tentatively classified as Type If.

Those subjects whose overall mean

"same" Rf was faster than their overall mean "different" RT were
tentatively classified as Type I.

Cach subject's "different" Rf data

was then examined to determine if there was a tendency for RT to
decrease as the distractor stimuli became increasingly dissimilar to
the standard.

This criterion was thought to be the least reliable

since only nine data points per distractor were used to compare with
the 45 data points per standard, hence one would expect more
variability within each distractor score.

Those Type II subjects

whose "different" Rfs tended to decrease with increasing distractor
dissimilarity remained classed as Type II.

Some Type II subjects,

however, failed to show decreasing RT with increasing distractor
dissimilarity.
1982).

These subjects were classified as Type IIA (Simmons,

For those subjects tentatively classified as Type I, some

demonstrated decreasing RT with increasing distractor dissimilarity.
These subjects were also classed as Type IIA.

'Hie remaining

subjects, those whose mean "same" RT was faster than their mean
"ditferent" RT and whose mean distractor RTs did not tend to
decrease, were classed as Type I.

Ihese classification criteria

resulted in 22 subjects being classed as Type II, 6 as Type IIA, and
only 2 as Type I (see Figure 2 and Appendix F).

Originally die KT data for both the Type I subjects and the Type
II subjects were to be subjected to a 2 x 2 x 2 within subjects AK'OVA
to examine I atera1ization effects.

However two subjects dropped from

the experiment after the initial classification session.
was classed as Type I and the other was Type II.
28 for the two latera 1 ization sessions.

One subject

This left an n^ of

With only one of the two

Type I subjects having latera1ization data, analysis of this
subject's data would be meaningless.

It was decided that data

analysis of the KT scores from the two lateraIization sessions would
consist of various combinations of the subject subgroups.

Separate

ANOVAs were done using, (1) the KT data for the Type I, Type II, and
Type IIA groups combined, (2) the RT data of only the Type II group,
and (3) the RT data of only the Type IIA group.

The factors used for

all the ANOVAs were stimulus type (letters vs. nonsense shapes),
visual field (left vs. right), and match (same vs. different).
An ANOVA of all the subjects combined (see Table 1 and Table 2)
yielded a significant main effect of Stimulus Type F(l,27) = 6.19,
.03.

The mean RT time for the letter stimuli was 666.77 msec and for

the nonsense shapes it was 714.91 msec, a difference of 48.14 msec.
There were two significant interaction effects, Stimulus Type X
Visual

Field, Kl,27 ) = 7 .09, p< .01, and Stimulus Type X Match,

F( 1 ,2 7 ) = 15 .87, P< .001.

Analysis of the simple main effects of

Visual Field in the Stimulus Type X Visual

Field interaction revealed

that the nonsense shape stimuli were processed 22.62 msec faster when
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Table 1
Source Fable For The Stimulus Type X Visual Field X Match ANOVA
of the Type I, Type II, and Type IIA Subjects Combined RT Data

Sour ce

df

MS

Stimulus Type
129784.96
Stimulus Type X Subjects 565727.97

27

129784 .96
20952.89

Visual Field
3843.66
Visual Field X Subjects 57803.55

3843.66
2140.87

1 .80

27

Match
Match X Subjects

3979.55
87573.91

1
27

3979.55
3243.48

1 .23

Stimulus Type X Visual Field
Stimulus Type X Visual Field
X Subjects

11506.27
43833.34

27

1 1 506.27
1623.46

Visual Field X Match 711.96
Visual Field X Match 51349.58
X Subjects

1
27

71 I .96
1901 .84

Stimulus Type X Match 43733.65
Stimulus Type X Match 74400.93
X Subjects

1
27

43733.65
2755.59

Stimulus Type X Visual Field 38.38
X Match
Stimulus Type X Visual Field
45905.14
X Match X Subjects

1

38.37

27

1700.19

1151898 .40

196

Tota 1

*p< .05
**p< .01
***p< .001

SS

6.19*

7.09**

.37

15.87***

.02
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Table 2
Mean KIs for bach Term in the Stimulus Type X Visual Field X Match ANOVA
for The Type I, Type II, and Type IIA Subjects Combined

Verba1
Non-Ver ba1

666.77
714.91

LVK
RVK

686.70
694.98

Same
Di f ferent

686.63
695.06
Ve r ba1

LVF
RVF

669.80
663.75
Verbal

Same
Di f ferent

Same
Di f ferent

648.58
684.96

703.60
726.22
Non-Verba1
724 .67
705.15

LVF

RVF

684.27
689.13

688.99
700.98

LVF

LVF

Ver ba1
Same
Different

Non-Ve r ba1

653.81
685 .79

Note. All values are in msec

Non-Ve rba1
714.73
692.47

RVF

RVF

Verba1

Non-Verba1

643.36
684 .1 3

734.61
717.83
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they were presented in the RVF (703.60 and 726.22 msec,
respectively).

There was no difference in RT between visual

presentation for the letter stimuli (669.63, and

field of

663.73 msec for the

LVF and RVF respectively), although the absolute differences were in
the expected direction.

Analysis of the simple main effects of Match

in the Stimulus Type X Match interaction revealed that RT difterences
between the two stimulus types depended upon the type of response
being made.

Mean "same" RT to the letter stimuli was 36.38 msec

faster than mean "different" RT (648.58 and 684.96 msec,
respectively), _F(l,27) = 11.57,

.01.

While mean "same" RT to the

nonsense shapes was 19.52 msec slower than the mean "different" RT
(724.67 and 705.15 msec respectively), this term approached but did
not quite reach significance, _F(1,27) = 3.81, jj= .06.
A second ANOVA was performed using only the data from the Type
II subjects (see Table 3 and Table 4).

The Stimulus Type main effect

approached but did not reach significance, _F(1,20) = 4.09, £> .056,
(668.48 and 718.92 msec for the letters and nonsense shapes,
respectively).

There was also a significant interaction between

Stimulus Type and Match, _F(l,20) = 9.12, £< .01.

Mean "same" RT for

the letter stimuli was 657.03 msec and mean "different" RT was
679.94.

Mean "same" RT for the nonsense shapes was 730.65 msec and

mean "different" RT was 707.20.
A third ANOVA was performed using the RT data from only the Type
11A subjects (see Table 5 and Table 6).

The Stimulus Type X Visual

Field interaction was significant, _F (1,5) = 9.85, £< .05.

Mean RT

Ta b I e

i

Source Table For The Stimulus Type
X Visual Field X March ANOVA of the Type II Subjects RT Data

Source

df

MS

Stimulus Type
106361.18
Stimulus Type X Subjects 521364.48

1
20

106861.18
26068.22

4.09

Visual Field
3909.22
Visual Field X Subjects 35835.95

3909.22
1791.80

2. 18

20

Match
3.03
Match X Subjects 58659.40

3.0 3
2932 .96

.001

20

2724 . 1 2
1373.67

.98

20

1
20

969 .66
1860.80

.52

20

22555 .99
24 7 3 . 64

Stimulus Type X Visual Field
Stimulus Type X Visual Field
X Subjects

SS

2724.12
27473.49

Visual Field X Match 969.66
Visual Field X Match 37216.08
X Subjects
Stimulus Type X Match 22555.99
Stimulus Type X Matcli 49472 .85
X S ub j e c t s
Stimulus Type X Visual Field
X Match
Stimulus Type X Visual Field
X Match X Subjects

Tot a 1

**p< .01

2287 .86

2287.86
80475.96

20

949809.27

147

4023.80

9.12**

.56

Table A
Mean K'ls for Kach

I'crni in the Stiniulus 'Type

X Visual Field X Match ANOVA for the Type II Subjects

Verbal
Non-Ver ba1

668.48
718.92

LVF
RVF

688.88
698.53

Same
DifterenL

693.83
69 3 .5 7
Verba1

LVF
RVF

667.69
669.28
Verba1

Same
Dit ferent

Same
Di f ferent

657.03
679.94

710.07
72 7 . 77
Non-Verba1
730.65
707.21

LVF

KVF

691 .63
686.13

696.05
701.70

LVF

LVF

Ve r ba1
Same
Different

Non-Ve rba1

656 . 35
679.02

Note. All values are in msec.

Non-Verba1
726.91
693.24

RVF

RVF

Ve r ba1

Non-Ve rba1

65 7 . 71
680.85

734.38
721 .16
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Table 5
Source table For The Stimulus Type
X Visual Field X Match ANOVA of the Type IIA Subjects RT Data

Source

SS

df

MS

Stimulus Type
11994.73
Stimulus Type X Subjects 35691.53

11994.73
7138. 31

V i s ua 1 Fi e 1 d
()91 . 30
Visual Field X Subjects 20687.97

691.30
41 37.59

Match
Match X Subjects

8395.80
10724.74

8395.80
2144.95

Stimulus Type X Visual Field
Stimulus Type X Visual Field
X Subjects

16560.73
8406.90

16560.73
1681 .37

9.85*

Visua I Fie 1d X Match 82.42
Visual Field X Match 12914.71
X Subjects

82 .42
2582.94

.03

Stimulus Type X Match 25344.18
Stimulus Type X Matcli 19955 . 34
X Subjects

25 344 . 13
3991 .07

6. 35

3488.43

3488.43

3.51

4969.21

993.84

Stimulus Type X Visual Field
X Match
Stimulus Type X Visual Field
X Match X Subjects

Tot a 1

*p< .05

179907.99

42

.68

.17.

3.91

Ta b 1 e 6
Mean Kls lor l-'.jch 'l£:rin in tht; Stimulus Type
X Visual Field X Match ANOVA for the Type I[A Subjects

Ver ba1
Non-Verba1

672.60
704.22

LVF
RVF

684.62
692.21

Same
Oilfe r e n t

675 .19
701.64
Verbal

LVF
KVF

68 7 . 38
657.82
Verba1

Same
Different

Same
Different

636.40
708.81

681.85
726.59
Non-Ve r ba1
713.97
694 .47

LVF

RVF

6 70 .08
699.15

680.29
704 . 1 2

LVF

LVF

Verba1
Same
Di fferent

Non-Verba1

65 8. 39
716.37

Note. All values are in msec.

Non-Verba1
681 .77
681 .93

RVF

RVF

Verba1

Non-Ver ba1

614.40
701.24

746.18
70 7 .00
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for the letters appearing in the LVF was 687.38 while letters
appearing in the RVK had a mean KT of 637.82.

Mean RT for the

nonsense shapes appearing in the LVF was 681.83, while shapes
appearing in the RVF had a mean Rf of 726.59.

These simple main

eftects, though not significant, are in the expected direction.

The

Stimulus Type X Match Interaction was also significant, F(l,5) =
6.35,

.05.

Mean RT "same" and "different"

was 636.40 msec and 708.81 msec.

for the letter stimuli

Mean RT "same" and "different" for

the nonsense shapes was 713.91 msec and 694.47 msec.
Chi-square analyses were performed on the error rate data from
the classification session.

There were significantly more errors

made on "sane" trials than on "different" trials, X
7.42, p< .01.

2

(1, N = 351) =

The five distractor stimuli also differed

significantly in their distribution of errors, X

2

(1, N = 351) =

234.99, p< .01, with the number of errors increasing as the
distractors increased in similarity to the standard.
Additional- chi-square analyses were performed on the two types
of stimuli to determine if the distribution of error rates differed
with respect to visual field.

There was no significant difference in

error rates across both visual

fields for the letters, X

= .37, p> .05, and for the shapes, X

2

2

(1, N = 67)

(1, _N = 1 37) = 3.52 , p> .05.

Discussion

Most notable among the results of the initial, classification
session is that only 2, or 7%, of the 30 subjects were classed as
Type I.

Both Cooper (1976; Cooper & Podgorney, 1976) and Simmons

(1982) reported the proportion of Type I subjects and Type II
subjects as being about .30 and .70 respectively (including the Type
I1A subjects in Simmons study as Type II). A chi-square analysis of
the frequency of Type I and Type II subjects in the present study,
based on Cooper's and Simmons' classification data, reveals that the
incidence of Type 1 and Type II subjects in the present study differs
significantly from the expected frequency, X

2

(l,_N=30) = 6.635 , £<

.01 .
A total of six subjects in the present study could not be
clearly classified as Type I or Type II.

They most nearly resembled

the Type II subjects so they were labeled Type IIA.

Cooper (1976;

Cooper & Podgorney, 1976) did not find these subjects in her
experiments.

Simmons (1982), using a reduced number of Cooper's

stimuli reported 9 out of 30 subjects as being Type IIA.
Rather than suggesting the existence of a third class of
subjects, the occurrence of the Type IIA subjects in Simmons' and the
present study are probably the result of using a reduced number of
standard and distractor stimuli from that used by Cooper (1976).
Cooper used a total of five standard stimuli and seven distractor

stimuli per standard.

This standard/distractor combination resulted

in a total of 420 comparisons per subjects, significant 1v more than
the 90 comparisons used in the present study.

Specifically, each

same" mean Rf score per subject in Cooper's study was based on 210
comparisons, whereas each "same" mean RT score per subject in the
present study was based on only 45 comparisons.

Each of the seven

mean distractor RT scores in Cooper's study was based on 30
individual comparisons, whereas in the present study, only nine
comparisons determined each mean distractor Rf.

Since so few raw

data points determined each mean distractor RT in the present study,
any given mean distractor RT was more readily influenced by extreme
score values.

Hence a random occurrence of a few extreme raw data

points probably contributed in affecting the "actual" mean value for
some of the distractor or standard stimuli, if indeed these subjects
are actually Type II, and may have resulted in a misc1 assification.
It is also interesting to note that, while more errors were made
in "same" responses in the present study, this finding is the exact
opposite of that found by Cooper (1976).

However in both studies

errors tended to decrease as the distractor stimulus decreased in
similarity to the standard.
The comparatively low incidence of Type I subjects in the
present study may be explained as simply a sampling problem.

That

is, by chance only 2 of the 30 subjects in the present study may have
actually been of the Type I variety.

4.}

Alternatively, some type of subject selection bias may have been
operatinj' to produce so few Type I subjects. Cooper (1976; Cooper &
Fodgorny , 19 76) reports that, of a total of 26 subjects in J
experiments, 11 were female and 1 male was left-handed.

Simmons

(1982) reports that 13 of a total of 30 right-handed subjects were
female.

Neither study controlled for familial handedness.

Since

gender, handedness, and fami1ia1-handedness have previously been
identified as factors affecting cognitive performance, it is not
unreasonable to assume that these variables may have interacted with
the subject's available cognitive resources in both Cooper's and
Simmons' studies to produce the subject classifications they
observed .
The criteria for subject selection used in the present study
were more stringent than those used in Cooper's and Simmons' studies.
To participate in the present study an individual had to be male,
right-handed, and have no immediate familial history of
1eft-handedness.

Additionally, all of the the subjects in the

present study were grossly screened for visual acuity.

These

criteria probably insured a more homogeneous subject sample than the
subject samples used in the previously cited studies.

It is not

unreasonable to assume that those factors influencing subject
heterogeneity (i.e. including females, left-handed males or males
with a familial history of Ieft-handedness ) may have been the same
ones operating to produce the Type I subjects in Cooper s and
Simmons' studies.

At any rate, the central thesis of the present

study, examining the effects of subject tvpe on the latera 1 ization of
cognitive processes, could not be adequately tested since so few Type
I subjects were observed.
Analysis of the lateraIization sessions KT data produced rather
interesting results.

The letter stimuli were consistently processed

faster than the nonsense shapes.

Bindra, Donderi, and Nishisato

(1968) have suggested that quicker "sane" responses are produced by
easily codable stimuli.

Since letters are probably the most

meaningful, overlearned, and easily codable stimuli, the faster RT to
the letters observed in the present study is not surprising.
Analysis of the significant Stimulus Type X Match interactions
reveals that, while the letter stimuli did produce faster "sane"
responses than "different" responses, the nonsense shapes produced
faster "different" responses than "same" responses.

Assuming the

most efficient processor is operative for any given combination of
task demand and cognitive resource composition, the faster KTs for
"different" responses for the nonsense shapes preclude the operation
of an analytical, feature-by-feature comparison process.

This

finding is also evident from the overall "same" vs overall
"different" classification data of the Type IT subjects, and three of
the Type IIA subjects given in Appendix F.
Also of note is the lark of a significant Match main effect in
any of trie analyses.

Since both types of stimuli were always

included in the same analysis, the consistently significant Stimulus
Type X Match interaction may explain the lack of a significant Match

'4 =

main effect.

The faster "same" response to Letter stimuli and the

faster "different" response to the nonsense shapes probably offset
each other to produce a negligible difference between "same" and
"different" responses.
Analyses of the RT data from the two latera1ization sessions
only partially suggest processing differences between the two
cerebral hemispheres.

An examination of the data from all the

subjects combined did yield a significant interaction between
Stimulus Type and Visual Field, but this interaction was significant
only because RT to the nonsense shapes was faster when the shapes
appeared in the LVF, and hence had direct access to the right, or
visuo-spatia1 hemisphere.

This finding is in agreement with much of

the hemispheric specialization literature (Bradshaw & Nettleton,
1981; Dimond & Beaumont, 1974).
However, there was no difference in RT scores between the LVF
and the RVF for the letters.

If the LH does have a processing

advantage for verbal material, then the RT to letter stimuli
appearing in the RVF should have been faster than the RT for letter
stimuli in the LVF.

In the Bagnara et al. (1982) study, there was a

significant LVF advantage using the same letters that were used in
the present study.

As an explanation of their observation of

opposite than expected lateralization effects, Bagnara et al. suggest
that "letters yield a RVF advantage only when comparisons are based
on their phonetic code"; comparisons based on the physical structure
of the letters yield mixed results.

Some researchers find a LVF
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advantnge (Cohen, 1972; Geffen, Bradshaw, and Nettleton, 1972), some
find a RVK advantage (filgeth and Cpstein, 1972), and still some find
no visual

field advantage (Simion et al., 1980, exp. 4).

Since the

letters used in the Bagnara et al. study and in the present

study

systematically varied in their degree of physical similarity (Taylor,
1976), then perhaps some of the subjects in the these studies
compared the letters based on their physical identity, rather than
their name identity.

An admixture of subjects who made letter

comparisons based on name identity witli subjects who made comparisons
based on physical identity would introduce error variance into the
Stimulus Type X Visual Field interaction.

It is not unreasonable to

conclude that the introduction of too many of these subjects would
yield a non-significant interaction between the letter stimuli and
visual field.
It was hypothesized that for the Type II subjects there would be
a significant Visual Field X Match interaction having tiie form ot RT
"same" being faster in the LVF and RT "different" being faster in the
RVF.

To the contrary this interaction was quite non-significant in

every analysis in the present study.

There is no evidence that

visual field had any effect upon the type of response made.

It is

difficult to explain the lack of evidence for the 1 atera1ization of
analytic and holistic processes to the LH and RH respectively,
assuming that these processing capabilities exist independently
within their respective hemispheres.

Certainly, the type of subjects

used could not be a source of confounding.

The subjects composing

U1

tlie present ex|)eriinent have previously been identified as beiriK the
most homogeneous with respect to hemispheric specialization.
Similarly, botli types of stimuli were specifically constructed for
the identification ot analytic and holistic processes and they have
been successful at doing so with non-latera1ized stimulus
presentations (Cooper, 197b; Taylor, 1976).
The lack of a significant Visual

Field X Match interaction is

identical with the results found by Bagnara et al

(1982).

Bagnara et

al. did find that RT decreased as the number of segments forming the
distractor letter increased.

In addition "same" responses were

significantly faster that "different" responses.

Thus, they conclude

that, "if the Taylor paradigm is accepted as implicating analytic and
holistic processes in visual comparison, it would appear that the
hemispheres are not differentiated in that respect:

botli can process

visual information analytically and ho Iistica1 Iy".
In sum, five observations can be gleaned from the data analysis
presented above:

(1) Significantly more subjects were classed as

Type II (including the Type IIAs) than was expected.

This may have

been due to an inadvertent subject selection bias which excluded Type
I subjects.

(2) RT to letter stimuli was significantly faster than

RT to nonsense shapes.

Certainly we can presume that the letter

stimuli were more meaningful and easily codable than the nonsense
shapes, hence they should have been processed faster.
"same" response to letter stimuli

(3) Making a

is faster than making a "different"

response, while making a "same" response to nonsense shapes is slower
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than making a "different" response.

'Hie interaction between Stimuliis

Type and Match supports the notion of faster "sane" responses to
easily codable stimuli.

(4) RT to nonsense shapes v/as faster than RT

to the letter stimuli when the shapes were presented in the LVF,
while no visual field differences were observed for the letters.
Possibly different hemispheric resource strategies were used by some
subjects to compare the letters.

(5) No evidence of

analytic/hoIistic latera1ization effects was found.

This was perhaps

the most significant finding, however it is not without precedent
(bagnara et al., 1982).
It is suggested that since both types of stimuli were
constructed such that each distractor varied systematically from it's
standard, both types of stimuli could have been readily processed
based on their physical identity.

In other words, there would be a

significant effect of the type of distractor on RT.

Distractors

least dissimilar to their respective standards should have longer RTs
titan distractors most dissimilar.

This hypothesis is not readily

tested from the analysis presented above, therefore another analysis
was done using only the distractor data.

The data were subjected to

a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA to assess the effects of distractor type upon RT.
The factors used were Type of Stimulus (verbal vs non-verbal), Visual
Field (left vs right), and Type of Distractor (leasl dissimilar vs
most dissimilar).
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 7 and Table 8.
there was a significant main eflect of Type of Distractor, _F( I , 2 7) =

'4 9

Ta b1e 7
Source lablt; For The Stimulus ly|>t} X Visual Field X Distractor Tvpe
ANOVA of the Type 1, Type II, and Type IIA Subjects RT Distractor Data

Source

SS

df

MS

Stimulus Type
23847.15
Stimulus Type X Subjects 551432.2b

23947.35
20423.42

1.17

27

Visual Field
17021.66
Visual Field X Subjects 132472.56

1
27

1 70 21 .66
4906.39

3.47

Distractor Type 364229.54
Distractor Type X Subjects 199594.77

1
27

364229.53
7392 .03

Stimulus Type X Visual Field 8036.55
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 85389.40
X Subjects

8036.55
3! 62 .57

2.54

27

Visual Field X Distractor Type 743.94
Visual Field X Distractor Type 69525.82
X S ub j e c t s

1
27

74 3 . 94
25 75 .03

,29

Stimulus Type X Distractor Type 19297.35
Stimulus Type X Di s t r n c t
Type 1 1 8791 .94
X Subjects

1
27

19297 . 35
4399 . 70

4. 39*

Stimulus Type X Visual Field 8397.08
X Distractor Type
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 183461.84
X Distractor Type X Subjects

I

8387 .08

,23

27

6794 .88

1151898.40

196

Tota 1

*£< .05
***£< .001

49.27***
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Ta b 1 e 8
Mean RT-s of Each Term in the Stimulus type X Visual Field X Uistractor
Type ANOVA for the Type 1, Type II, and Type TIA Subjects
Combined Distractor Data

Ver baI
Non-Ver ba L

69 3.65
714.28

LVF
RVF

694.24
713.54

Least Diss
Most Diss.

74 3.07
664.68
Verba1

LVF
RVF

690 .12
697.23
Verba1

Least Diss,
Most Diss.

Least Diss,
Most Diss.

723.18
663.59

698.44
729.85
Non-Verba1
763.68
665 .77

LVF

RVF

734.96
65 3 .45

751 .1 7
675.91

LVF

LVF

Verba1
Least Diss,
Most Diss.

Non-Verbal

726.79
652.14

Note. All values are in msec.

Non-Verba1
74 3 . 74
654 .75

RVF

RVF

Ve r baI

Non-VerbaI

719 .43
675.03

782.94
676.79

49.27, £< .OOl.

The least dissimilar distractor RTs were 78.19 msec

slower than the the most dissimilar distractor RTs (741.05 and hh4.68
msec respectively).

There was also a significant interaction between

Stimulus Type and Type of Distractor, F(l,27) = 4.39, p< .05.
Analysis of the simple main effects of type of distractor reveals
that thert" was a significant effect of stimulus type upon the least
dissimilar distractor RT data.

For the least dissimilar distractor

Rfs, the verbal stimuli were processed 40.5 msec faster than the than
the shapes (723.18 and 763.68 msec respectively).

This term

approached but did not quite reach significance, F(l,27) = 3.5, p=
.07.

For the most dissimilar distractor RTs, the difference between

the verbal and non-verbal stimuli were negligible (663.59 and 665.77
msec respectively).

No interaction with visual

field as a term was

si gn i f i ca nt .
The results of this analvsis indicate that standard/distractor
comparisons for both types of stimuli were made on the physical
characteristics of the stimuli.

Reaction time decreased with

increasing distractor dissimilarity, which also denotes the operation
of an analytic type of processor.

Also, when a difficult

standard/distractor comparison is being made (as in the case of the
least dissimilar distractor RTs), RT is shorter with the more readily
codable letter stimuli than with the shapes.

Easily made

discriminations yield no such stimulus type .advantage.
In general, all of the discriminative RT analyses presented
above suggest that both verbal and non-verbal stimuli can be
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processed with an analytic or feature-hy-1 enture comparison based on
the physical

identity ot

the stiiiinli.

There is no evidence that

either hemisphere has an advantage along this process dimension.
I here is also no evidence for the notion of a holistic processor,
lateralized or not, since the recognized criterion for this
processor, "same" responses being significantly faster than
"different" responses, failed to materialize in the present
ex pe r iment .
Further research is needed along an individual

difference

dimension in cognitive resources in general, and specialization of
hemispheric function in particular.

In particular, future research

is needed to explore the relationship, if any, between previous Iv
recognized factors that affect cognitive performance (i.e. handedness
and gender), and the Type I/Type TI classification scheme.

For

example, subjects could be grouped according to gender, subject
handedness, and familial handedness, and the relationship between
their grouping and Type I/Type II classification could be examined.
Future research is also needed to determine the reliability of the
Type I/Type II classification scheme.

If the Type I/Type II

classifications are merely transient, then the low incidence of Type
I subjects in the present study becomes moot.
It is also suggested that instead of trying to identify
simplistic, dichotomous entities that are presummed to reside within
the two cerebral hemispheres, research is needed to identify the
significant parameters that result in differential performance levels
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within and between subjects on a given task.

liertelson (1982) has

suggested that the analytic/holistic classification scheme in
particular is inherently fraught with limitations:
Ihe analytic/holistic distinction is however a vague one.
hike most terms borrowed from everyday language, it carries
a number of different meanings.

This is not a reason to

prohibit such importations, but the danger exists that
terms of that kind be taken more seriously than they
deserve, leading to unwarranted generalizations from some
of their meanings to others. .

. If one tries to translate

the holistic/analytic dichotomy into more operational
terms, which would allow testable predictions, one finds
that it is compatible with several not necessarily
equivalent translations such as focal attention vs.
pre-attentive segmentation of the sensory field, attention
to local detail rather than overall configuration,
serial classification vs. parallel testing of several
features (or template matching), attention to high
frequency vs.

low frequency Fourier components.

.

. many

explanatory successes of the ana lytic/uoIistic dichotomy
are actually post-hoc.

Marshall

(1981) took the example of

the task consisting of choosing among several circles
the one of which a particular arc is a part, and which work
with split-brain patients has shown to be better
accomplished by the isolated KM (Nebes, 1974).

Brudshnw
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and Nettfilton (1981) describe the task as involving
"the ability to to nn a complete Gestalt

(e.". a circle)

from incomplete intormation (e.g. arcs of a circle)".
Ami Marshall comments: "Had tiie data gone the other wav,
we can be sure that the task would have been described
as implicating the ability to decotnpose circles into
their constitute arcs (an analytic operation). . . ".
(p. 197-198).

The disdain which is reflected by Bertelson (1982) exists in
part because of a lack of consensus in operationally defining
analytic and holistic processes.

Although the present study does not

directly address this problem (and indeed, may contribute to it), it
is clear that some consistency in definition is needed if the
"analytic/holistic" dichotomy is to yield further, meaningful
resea rch .
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Appendix A
Harris Questionnaire
In order to participate in the study you must complete this
questionnaire.
Please answer the questions below as best as you can.
Please do not leave any questions blank.
If you do not answer every
question, there is a good chance that you will not participate, hence you
will receive no money.
Narne:

Landrum Box#: Phone #:

With which hand do you. .

.

Left Right

1. Throw a BalI
2. Wind a Watch
3. Hammer a Nail
4. Brush Teeth
5. Com b Hai r
6. Turn Door Knob
7. Hoid Eraser
8. Use Scissors
9. Cut with Knife
10. Wri te

Answer the following questions Yes, No, or DNA (Does Not Apply).

1. Is your father predominantly right-handed.

Yes No DNA

2. Is your mother predominantly right-handed.

Yes No DNA

3. If you have any sisters, are all of them
predominantly right-handed.

Yes No DNA

4. If you have any brothers, are all of them
predominantly right-handed.

Yes No DNA

6}

Appendix B
Con sent Form

1 understand that participation in this study is voluntary and
that 1 will be exposed to no bodily or psychological stress.

1 will

be required to make perceptual judgements on visual stimuli over a
period of three sessions, and the data will be used as part of a
masters thesis.

The data will be held in confidentiality and will in

no way affect my grade in any class, except for the addition of the
extra-credit points.

I may withdraw participation at any time.

1

further understand that if I do withdraw participation before the end
of the 3rd session I will receive no money points for any prior
pa rt i c i pa t i on .

Name:
Date:
ID#:

Appendix C
Instructions for First Session

This is the first of three sessions.
for tli is session.

On the machine in front of you, there is a place

for you to look into.

At first you will see a center cross.

called the "fixation point".
eyes from it.

These are the instructions

This is

Look at this point; do not remove your

Immediately following this point, you will see a

geometric shape.

Notice this shape; do not remove your eyes from it

as it will be visible for only a short time.
this shape you will see another one.

Immediately following

Your task at this point, is

simply to make a decision as to whether the two shapes that you saw
were the same or different shapes.

If you think that they were the

same, say "same" into the microphone below the viewer.

If you think

that they were different, say "different" into the microphone.
your decisions as fast and as accurate as possible.

Make

This will

constitute a "trial".
After you finish this trial the machine will be reset, and a new
trial will begin with another fixation point.

You will then see two

new shapes, and you will decide whether these two are the same or
different .
Keep the following points in mind.

Always look at the direct

center of the screen, in other words, on the fixation point.
to make it easier for you to view the shapes.

This is

Also, on any given

trial the probability that the two shapes are actually the same or
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di E fereut is equal.

There will be an equal

number of same and

different trials so try not to guess.
We will run through a few practice trials at first.
any questions?

Are there

Appendix D
Instructions for Second Session

During tliis session, you will again be presented with several
trials of two stimuli, and you will be asked to make "same-different"
judgements on tliese stimuli.
from the first session.

However a few things will be different

This time, instead of saying "same" or

"different" into a microphone you will respond by tapping your
fingers on a mechanical key.

If you think that the two stimuli were

different, press the outermost left key with your left index finger.
If you think that they were the same, press the outer-most right key
with your right index finger.

At all times when you are not

responding keep your fingers positioned on the two innermost keys.
This will

let me know that you are ready to begin another trial.

Also, sometimes the second stimulus that you see will be either
to the left or right of the first stimulus.

Since the chances that

the second stimulus will appear in any one of these positions are
equal, keep your eyes fixated at the center.

This will give you the

best chance of making a fast, accurate response.
a few practice trials.
Are there any questions?

We will start with
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Appendix £
InsLruetions for Third Session

This is the third and final session.
exactly like the second.

This session will be

If you think that the two stimuli are

different, then press the outermost left key with you left index
finger.

If you think that the two stimuli were the same, press the

outermost right key with your right index finger.

At all other times

keep your fingers placed on the two innermost keys.
like in the second session, the second stimulus will appear
randomly either to the left or to the right.

Keep your eyes fixated

on the center to maximize your decision making.
practice trials before we begin.
Are there any questions?

There will be a few
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Appendix F
Subject Dat.i from the Classification Session*

D i s t rac tor St i mu1i
Most Similar to Least Similar
Subject
Type I
JL
CD

Same
Different
RT RT

D1

D2

D3

D4

05

Overa11
Mean RT

801.29
775.51

843.47
788.73

628.87
744.00

758.55
832.66

623.22
830.88

639.78
765.55

567 .1 1
770.55

629.04
782.62

Type II
KB
RL
AG
JB
BR
VM
JP
DM
BB
JM
JA
CR
WF
KG
PC
AL
JW
JOL
HD
WM
GP
CC

873.50
893.09
1008.20
845.09
11 24.80
938.24
980.00
623.00
732.90
950.13
960.42
697 .60
744.78
702.09
630.20
675.36
1092.96
1086.78
747 .93
1023.71
773.18
875.84

795.60
758.13
894.76
714.91
1028.84
725.96
939.56
562 .42
709.51
862.42
860.47
676.24
725 .87
646.42
608.67
662.00
1019.71
921.29
714.64
868.96
752.44
797.84

865 .80
829.1 1
972 .89
797 . 56
1109.22
654 . 1 I
1117.22
572.00
737.40
910.89
924.67
750.00
827.00
726 . 1 1
620.70
720.33
1255.78
998.78
770.44
958.89
804.67
872 . 33

861 .00
797.89
958.44
803.56
1211 .44
842.78
987.56
581.30
770.80
1011.67
891 .22
693.70
753.78
705 .67
645 .00
723.33
1078 . 78
951.89
709.44
900.67
75 3 . 1 1
807.22

780.60
714.33
830.33
653.00
944.11
713.78
874.33
541.20
682.40
873.89
883.00
620.70
704 .00
592 .44
600. 20
655 .00
945 .1 1
871.89
698.67
810.33
746.79
903.56

754.70
746.56
894.67
645.00
921.89
707.00
848.44
566.50
681 .50
781 .1 I
81 4 .1 1
673.00
672 . 78
607.44
605.60
605 . 78
927.67
894.33
713.33
881 .44
734 . 1 1
744 .44

715.60
702 . 78
817.44
675 .44
957.56
712.1 1
870.22
551 .00
675 . 20
734 .56
789.33
64 3.60
671 .78
600.44
571.60
605 .56
891 .22
889.56
681.33
793.44
726.56
761.67

834.60
825.61
951 .48
780.00
1076.82
832 . 10
959.78
592 . 7.1
721.21
906.28
910.44
686.95
735.32
674.26
619.40
668.68
1056.33
1004.03
731 .29
946.33
762.81
836.84

Type 11A
PB
DW
TH
AJ
JC
DOW

788.84
1111.98
678.75
924.87
741.89
1066.73

737.77
943.64
701 .46
937.42
774.89
950.31

730.33
971.00
758.33
1155 .22
904.00
878.11

776.33
935 .56
720.88
979.00
812.44
1055.11

716.1 1
966.11
722.50
950.22
700 .67
1083.22

740 .00
901 .44
644 . 30
813.1 1
713.78
914.1 1

726 .1 1
944 .1 1
661 .40
789.55
739.78
821 .00

763.31
1027.81
690.13
931 .14
758.01
1008.52

* A11 va1ues in msec

